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Libelous Ridicule By Journalists
James M. Naughton* and Eric R. Gilbertson*-
H E LAUGHS BEST who laughs last-especially if he chuckles in print.
i Everyone who knows his elementary cliches is aware that the pen
is mightier than the sword. What some forget, however, is that the quill
can tickle you to death.
You laugh? Which is more devastating: a four page leaflet attack-
ing the Alabama labor record of George C. Wallace, or a simple inquiry,
"Spiro T. Who?"
Indeed the written word has impact. In a sense that is why it is
protected by the Constitution. And, for the same reason, that is why
someone gets hauled into court every so often in a defamation suit.
Public officials in particular are sensitive about their images in
print. Some of them are known to use locker room language to describe
anyone who questions their actions on paper. One Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, political figure spent half an hour on the telephone not too many
months ago complaining to a friend about the way he had been treated
in an article making fun of his actions.
James Reston, executive editor of The New York Times, noted in his
book, The Artillery of the Press,' that leaders of the United States for-
eign policy establishment should face a "relentless barrage of facts and
criticism, as noisy but as accurate as artillery fire." What Reston did not
note is that the most devastating artillery in mankind's verbal arsenal is
that which is loaded with laughter.
When it touches on a social or political theme, "Pogo" can have
more pop than the crackle of editorial rifle fire on Page One. An Art
Buchwald column wondering aloud whether there really is a J. Edgar
Hoover can start a national flap. And there are few things more cutting
than a Conrad cartoon, such as the one noting an order by newly-elected
Gov. Ronald Reagan to cut everything in the California budget 10%; the
cartoon showed Reagan carrying his head under his arm.
Is it liable to be libel? No, thank God.
Not since the 1964 ruling by the United States Supreme Court in
Sullivan v. New York Times,2 a landmark decision which-taken with
subsequent rulings opening the Sullivan application to public figures
other than officials-makes criticism of public officials privileged unless
"actual malice" is involved.
* Reporter for the New York Times, Washington, D.C., Bureau; B.A., University of
Notre Dame.
** M.A., Ohio University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University.
1 Reston, The Artillery of the Press, p. vii (Introduction) (Harper & Row, New York,
1967).
2 84 S.Ct. 710, 376 U.S. 255, 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964).
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"Fair Comment" Rule
Before Sullivan,3 jesting in print could be perilous. The test in Pig-
natelli v. New York Tribune, Inc.,4 in 1921, was whether the plaintiff was
exposed to ridicule, because, it was held, "ridicule in and of itself, if it
has harmful results, is enough." Nearly a century earlier, the court, in
Donoghue v. Hayes5 was equally exacting: "The principle is clear that
a person shall not be allowed to murder another's reputation in jest."
The rule applied to newspapers and other news-bearing public media
was generally that all items which were "fair comment" on matters of
public concern were privileged and protected from libel actions.6 The
rule was strongly conditioned, however, by the requirement that this
"fair comment" be concerned solely with the material that was of public
concern. In Buckstaff v. Viall,7 the court found that an editorial article,
defaming the plaintiff, went too far in a personal attack to remain within
the privilege. The editorial, entitled "A Prayer to Bucksniff," an obvious
reference to Dickens' contemptuous character Pecksniff, sarcastically re-
ferred to the plaintiff, a State Legislator, as "His Majesty Bucksniff,"
a "legislative God," and "his third Ward Omnipotence." In requesting
his "Grace" to aid in the passing of certain amendments, "while it is
within thy mighty power to defeat the will of the people," the Editor
alleged that Buckstaff was conceited, pompous, etc., and went beyond
"fair comment" on matters of public concern.8
The extent of the privilege was probably best stated in Trigg v. Sun
Printing and Publishing Co.,9 when the court distinguished between fair
comment on matters of public concern, and defamation. There it was
stated that "criticism deals only with such things as invite public atten-
tion or call for public comment," and that, "It never attacks the indi-
vidual, but only his work." Under this rule, the courts have held as
actionable a cartoon and article inferring that a State Legislator used
undue influence (liquor and money) in passing a bill,10 a printed article
inferring that a foreign nobleman was in the United States to avoid
working," and an item in a weekly gossip column charging that the
plaintiff exemplified "typical Yankee thrift" by alleging that he built his
own casket and dug his own grave (at an early age) to avoid the ex-
3 Ibid.
4 117 Misc. 466, 172 N.Y.S. 605 (1921); rule also stated in Trigg v. Sun Printing and
Publishing Co., 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904); and Powers v. Dargin Snow Pub-
lishing Co., 154 Me. 108, 144 A. 2d 294 (1958).
5 Hayes Irish Exchequer 265, 266 (1831).
6 Buckstaff v. Viall, 84 Wis. 129, 54 N.W. 111 (1893); Trigg v. Sun Printing and Pub-
lishing Co., supra note 4.
7 Buckstaff v. Viall, supra note 6.
8 Ibid.
9 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904).
10 Randall v. Evening News Association, 79 Mich. 266, 44 N.W. 783 (1890).
11 Pignatelli v. New York Tribune Inc., 117 Misc. 466, 172 N.Y.S. 605 (1921).
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pense. 12 All were held libelous per se and outside this "fair comment"
privilege.
Not until some time later was there any evidence of a change in this
posture. A Massachusetts court, in 1948, held, in Hartman v. Boston
Herald Traveller Corp.,"3 that "fair comment may be severe and include
ridicule, sarcasm and invective." More important, the ruling stated that
"severity and vigor in expression . . . are not to be confused with
malice in motive." Similarly, a Federal court in 1955 determined that
ridicule of a self laudatory brochure put out by a candidate for public
office "did not exceed fair comment" on a matter of public concern. 14
Effects of New York Times v. Sullivan
Granting that the critique is of a public figure, since Sullivan" he
is fair game. It seems likely that this ruling, while not specifically indi-
cating it, would permit (so long as malice is not involved) ridicule of
a public official as well as straightforward criticism. Because of over-
riding importance in keeping open channels of criticism and debate, the
court held, all criticism of public officials in their official capacity is at
least conditionally privileged.
Sullivan provided that the only ground for an action by a public
official would be through proof of "actual malice," a showing of "reckless
disregard for the truth," or actual knowledge that a story was false. 16
As it was, two members of the Supreme Court-Justices Black and
Douglas-held in a concurring opinion that there should be an absolute
right to criticize public officials, with no recourse to an action for dam-
ages even if actual malice was shown.17
Even to a newspaperman, the position staked out in Sullivan by
Justices Black and Douglas appears a bit extreme. There is no consti-
tutional guarantee against reckless publishers; surely there should not
be freedom to commit wholesale assault on the character of a public
personality without the slightest regard for the truth.
The Sullivan rule was taken a bit further by the Supreme Court in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.'8 There, it was held that the privilege
of criticising public officials set forth in Sullivan should also apply to
comment on certain individuals who become a "public figure" by reason
of a substantial public interest in their activities. The rationale for this
decision again rested on the overriding public interest in maintaining,
12 Powers v. Dargin Snow Publishing Co., supra note 4.
13 323 Mass. 56, 80 N.E. 2d 16 (1948).
14 Mark J. Hammett v. Times Herald Inc., 227 F. 2d 328 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied
76 S.Ct. 546, 350 U.S. 996 (1955).
15 Sullivan v. New York Times Co., supra note 2.
16 Ibid.
17 Id.
18 87 S.Ct. 1975, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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free from fear of legal repercussions, the channels of public debate and
comment on issues related to public interest. The fact that a person was
unwittingly, or even unwantingly, thrust into the position of a "public
figure" will not aid him in bringing suit.
The plaintiff in Butts was held to be a public figure by reason of his
position as Athletic Director at the University of Georgia. 19 Other cases
have determined that a "public figure" may be a professional baseball
player, 20 a schoolteacher involved in a public controversy, 21 a high school
football coach,22 a well-known advocate of strong political views even
though not a candidate for office, 23 and the law partner of a public official
who becomes involved in a political campaign. 24
Actual Malice
The key to determination of libel in a post-Sullivan courtroom is
whether malice is involved. Butts was held to have proven actual malice
because the Saturday Evening Post published accusations about game
fixing based solely on a telephone conversation that supposedly was
overheard by a somewhat less than impeccable source.25 This was such
"wanton and reckless indifference" as to the truth and constituted such
an "extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
adhered to by responsible publishers," that actual malice could be im-
plied from its publication. 26
"Actual malice" is, however, an extremely difficult standard of guilt
to prove. Barry Goldwater, the 1964 Republican nominee for the Presi-
dency, brought suit against the publishers of Fact magazine for their
allegations that he was suffering from mental illness and therefore was
unfit to hold that office. 27 This case was remanded for a trial court to
determine whether or not actual malice was present. Drew Pearson,
however, was unsuccessful in his suit against an Alaskan publisher who
called his columns "garbage," and him a "garbage man." 28 Public fig-
ures, everywhere, might then be warmed by the knowledge that those
who dish it out in turn become public figures and must be able to take it.
That seems wonderfully poetic. The critic should have a sincere
19 Ibid.
20 Warren Spahn v. Julian Messner Inc., 21 N.Y. 2d 124, 233 N.E. 2d 840 (1967);
Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting Co., 392 F. 2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968).
21 Ramsey v. Zeigner, 79 N.M. 457, 444 P. 2d 968 (1968).
22 Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 97, 172 N.E. 139 (1930).
23 Walker v. Courier Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
24 Gilberg v. Goffi, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 823, affd. 260 N.Y.S. 2d 29, 207 N.E. 2d 620 (1965).
25 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra note 18; the source was an insurance sales-
man who was currently on probation for issuing bad checks.
26 Ibid.
27 Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
28 Drew Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 64 Alaska 2d 245, 413 P. 2d 711
(1966).
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belief in his commentary, a desire for fairness, a search for results rather
than mere rhetoric and, above all, a thick skin. He who throws balls had
better own a catcher's mitt. One of the authors of this comment has
carried on a running critique over the last several years with a local
political figure who does not return telephone calls, yet the author felt
compelled to offer the politician a chance to write a newspaper column
during the author's vacation. (The offer was rejected.)
It seems readily apparent that since ridicule is among the most
potent forms of criticism, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly include
it under the privilege of the Sullivan rule. Thus, the pinprick of satire
or sarcasm would have to be caused by a mean, cantankerous, lowdown
lout with malice in mind, to be actionable by a public figure whose per-
formance was being questioned.
Though pre-Sullivan in date, the decisions in Hammet and Hartman
were founded on a rule not far short of that in Sullivan. There, the
courts held that ridicule of a political candidate 29 and a professor in-
volved in a "Peace Now" movement" was privileged under the "fair
comment" rule and as such was not actionable. The court ruled that
there was no proof of actual malice in a newspaper's ridicule of a self
laudatory brochure put out by a political candidate, 31 and held that
merely because the language used in ridiculing the professor involved
in the Peace movement was a bit robust, 32 actual malice was not estab-
lished.33
In Joe Julian v. American Business Consultants,34 the court held
that under the "fair comment" rule, "even if the publication holds one
up to public ridicule, contempt, and reproach it is not actionable if the
facts form a reasonable basis of inference." 35 Our problem then is not
so much one of whether ridicule is protected, but rather, what ridicule
is protected.
It was a key concern prior to Sullivan that criticism-whether
tongue in cheek or an outright razzberry-be directed at a public posture
rather than a personal attribute. In Trigg v. Sun Printing & Publishing
Assn.,36 a series of articles ridiculing an English professor at the Univer-
sity of Chicago was ruled libelous because it presented the instructor as
29 Mark J. Hammett v. Times Herald Inc., supra note 14.
30 Hartman v. Boston Herald Traveler Corp., supra note 13.
31 Mark J. Hammett v. Times Herald Inc., supra note 14. The court here held that
the newspaper's query "like to go with him steady?" following a report of the self
laudatory brochure did not infer that he was a homosexual.
32 It might be noted in Hartman that at the time the plaintiff was engaged in the
"Peace Now" movement, it may not have been too terribly popular (1943-4).
33 Hartman v. Boston Herald Traveler Corp., supra note 13.
34 155 N.Y.S. 2d 1, 2 N.Y. 2d 1, 137 N.E. 2d 1 (1956).
35 In Julian, the article allegedly made the plaintiff, a radio and television performer,
look like a communist dupe. The date, 1956, again may give us some perspective on
the decision as it places the case in the closing years of the McCarthy era.
86 Supra note 4.
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"illiterate, uncultivated, coarse and vulgar," when the comments might
just as easily have been directed at the professor's work. The court
spelled out a boundary which even Sullivan may not have crossed:
"Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention or call
for public comment" and, "It never attacks the individual, but only his
work." 37
It is clear that decisions such as Buckstaf 38 (sarcastic prayer to a
State Legislator) would be overruled by Sullivan,3 9 and perhaps even
the decisions in Randall v. Evening News Association4 and Pignatelli.4 1
But the decision in Trigg42 leaves a haunting doubt. In distinguishing
clearly between criticism of one's public position and attacks on a person
himself, we are left with the possibility that undue abuse of a public fig-
ure's person, as opposed to those things "which invite public attention or
call for public comment," may be open to redress through a libel suit.
A plaintiff bringing such a suit would, however, have the burden
imposed by Sullivan of establishing "actual malice." It could be argued
that attacks on the person, rather than his public work, are evidence of
actual malice by their very nature, since by definition personal traits,
etc., are not objects which demand public criticism, whereas public work
does. The inherent difficulty here, however, lies in determining which
characteristics of a public figure, particularly of a public official, do in
any way affect his public posture and consequently, his public activities.
Certainly conceit, immaturity, or dishonesty, all would have a profound
effect on the capability of a public official in the performing of his work.
It might even be convincingly argued that a Southern drawl or ski-slope
shaped nose could profoundly influence the diplomatic and political skills
and acceptability of a high level public official, and as such are privileged
items of criticism for Journalists.
Conclusion
Proof of actual malice, or even establishing that an attack in ridicule
bears no relation to public conduct, seems at best, extremely difficult to
bring out. The public interest in protecting itself, through criticism of
those in prominence, weighs much more heavily on the scales of justice
than does the interest of public figures in protecting themselves from
personal attack. So go ahead and draw your cartoons, Conrad. Keep
sticking pins in the kewpie dolls of America, Art Buchwald. And tell it
like it is, Pogo.
37 Ibid.
38 Buckstaff v. Viall, supra note 6.
39 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2.
40 Randall v. Evening News Association, supra note 10.
41 Pignatelli v. New York Tribune Inc., supra note 11.
42 Trigg v. Sun Printing and Publishing Co., supra note 4.
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